

From plans in the Quarter Master Generals Office.

Scale 1 Mile = 2 Inches.

NOTE. The Troops are shewn as distributed on the 17th Nov. 1857 & during the relief.

(True Copy)

R. S. Sumner
Deputy Quarter Master General.

REFERENCES.

Troops  

Road.

Advance of Relief

14334
A LECTURE

ON

THE RELIEF OF LUCKNOW

DELIVERED IN

THE SIMLA INSTITUTE,

ON THE

7th August 1867.

BY

COLONEL H. W. NORMAN, C.B.,



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
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1867





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U.S. INSTITUTION
of India
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

It may be said that few events have occurred in India, since we first landed in the country, in which a deeper interest has been felt than "The Defence of the Residency of Lucknow;" and, though the anxiety for the safety of that noble Garrison which pervaded all classes of our countrymen, whether here or in England, was removed nearly ten years ago by the safe withdrawal of the survivors, the story of that Defence will never lose its interest to successive generations of Englishmen, and before I proceed to the subject of my Lecture, "The Relief of Lucknow," let us dwell for a few minutes on the circumstances in which the defenders of Lucknow were placed at the outbreak of the great Mutiny of 1857.

The kingdom of Oudh had been annexed not very much more than a year previously, and it could not be said that all the people were pleased at the change of rulers; while certainly, reductions in the large force kept up by the King of Oudh had cast adrift in the province many men who would gladly, if suitable opportunity offered, resort to arms against us. Generations of misrule had existed, and, in consequence, the various Chiefs and powerful Zemindars had been in the habit of residing in forts and keeping up large bodies of armed followers, who were accustomed to fight with cannon, matchlock, or sword, after their own native fashion, whenever called on to do so in their master's interests, generally against other Chiefs, but sometimes against the King's troops.

In truth, it may be said that, in 1857, while the bulk of the Bengal Army was recruited from Oudh, there were still left in the province a larger proportion of men habituated to the use of arms, than in any other part of British India, and in this I do not except the Punjab proper, in which indeed, hardly a shot had been fired for eight years. The number of cannon, too, of native manufacture, in the hands of Chiefs in every part of Oudh, was very great.

So much for the population, who, it was to be feared, would hardly have had time to appreciate the benefits of our rule as a mass, and the armed portion of which was mainly under the control of Chiefs, who could not be supposed to be very friendly to us; feeling, as most of them probably did, that their influence was

not likely to be increased by our presence in Oudh, and the establishment of Courts of Justice to which they must be as amenable as the humblest peasant, while some of them had great personal grievances, owing to our recent unfavorable settlement of their lands.

To turn from the population to the Army; if the aspect of Oudh was not encouraging, apart from the Army, when the mutiny broke out, how little room was there for hope when the military force in that province was considered.

At Lucknow, little more than six hundred soldiers of the 32nd Regiment, and a Battery of European Artillery of sixty Gunners constituted the whole force that was reliable in the kingdom; while the Native Troops of the Bengal Army and Oudh Contingent amounted to 16,000 effective Infantry and Cavalry with thirty perfectly equipped Field Guns. Looking at these odds, who would have foretold a successful resistance; for although, by rare good fortune, some few of the Natives might be kept faithful, the majority must sympathise with their comrades, who, before blows had actually taken place in Oudh, had openly committed themselves against us in other parts of the country.

But in addition to this immense preponderance of Troops likely to be arrayed against them, with a population of eight millions, more or less, at their back, in a season when Europeans, kept in comfort, are not able to do much, still less when shut up in close entrenchments in a great city with poor food, what prospects of aid were there from without the province?

On the extreme north-west was Rohilcund, with more than 4,000 Native troops of all arms, of the Bengal Army, all arrayed, or about to be arrayed against us, without a single white Soldier in the Province save their officers. Coming downwards, we arrive at Futtehgurh where a regiment of Native Infantry alone was stationed, shortly to mutiny and to coalesce with the Nawab in acts of treachery and cruelty. Next we come to Cawnpore, where a garrison company of European Artillery, without Field Guns, and the weak depôt of the 32nd Regiment was the British force, as opposed to more than 3,000 Native soldiers of all arms. At Allahabad, no white soldiers were at first to be seen, and the arrival of a handful with some Seikhs barely saved the Fort and Arsenal from falling into the hands of the mutineers, who treacherously and dastardly murdered Officers, whose fault, as soldiers, was that they could not bring them-

selves to believe that those with whom they served, and in whom they had confided, would at once, and without any real provocation, prove traitors and assassins.

Only two other stations need be named as being near to Oudh. These are Goruckpoor, held by a regiment of Native Infantry, which mutinied at an early stage, and Benares, where a force of more than 2,000 Native Cavalry and Infantry were stationed, with only 60 Europeans manning a Bullock Battery. These latter and the British inhabitants were saved from general massacre, though not without loss of life, by the timely arrival of a small force of British Infantry.

Aid was therefore not to be hoped for; and if Benares and Allahabad were eventually saved, Cawnpore, Futteghur, and Rohilcund passed into the hands of enemies. It would be wrong here, however, to omit that, at the first, Sir H. Lawrence, recognising the importance of Cawnpore, sent a detachment of the 32nd Regiment there, which, when things looked much worse in Oudh, Sir H. Wheeler sent back to Lucknow. This Officer also sent to Lucknow one of his earliest, and, as it turned out, one of his latest reinforcements, a Company of the 84th, which arrived from the Presidency. Noble conduct! and which might well counterbalance some imperfections in that veteran General's arrangements, which we, wise after the event, and perhaps not even now aware of all his difficulties, have since discovered.

In such a posture of affairs, with all odds so much against them, without one bright spot on which to look, it is not to be wondered at if some hearts quailed and all thoughtful minds in Oudh turned, humanly speaking, to Sir Henry Lawrence, hoping that by his judgment, experience and tact, the worst might be staved off; and certainly if it had been possible for a man to do this, Sir H. Lawrence was the man; for, placed by Lord Canning in chief military as well as civil control of the province, he possessed in a remarkable degree, every quality likely to render him useful at such an emergency. With large civil and political experience, great knowledge of the Natives, towards whom he entertained the most friendly feelings, and much personal influence, his knowledge of war was extended, for he had served in the Burmese, Cabul, Sutledge, and Punjab campaigns.

Even his unwearied exertions could not, however, avert for more than a few weeks a general mutiny and a very general rising; but his forethought and activity led to the collection of quantities of

supplies, and to the construction of defences which, under Providence, enabled the garrison of Lucknow when forced to retire behind walls, to hold out, though with heavy losses, until succour reached.

It were long to tell of all that occurred at the various out stations, and at Lucknow itself, in these eventful months of May and June 1857. Suffice it that station after station in Oudh fell, that from some the Christian inhabitants escaped, carrying but the clothes upon their backs, in some cases, after hardships and toils, reaching Allahabad or Benares, but more generally coming into Lucknow to add to the number there to be fed and provided for. At other places they were murdered, often under circumstances of treachery and barbarity. Gladly do I avoid having to tell the painful tale of many a noble Officer, civil and military, who died at his post, and of tender women who were killed, or who, like Mrs. Orr and Miss Jackson, were taken prisoners, or, like the other Miss Jackson, who, after wandering in the jungle, perished, it is even now hardly known where, and under what circumstances.

Long before the end of June, all Oudh had passed away from our rule. The native troops at Lucknow had mutinied in their cantonments, the Brigadier Commanding being killed on the occasion, and the bulk of them gone off with their arms, or been dismissed as no longer to be trusted. On the 30th, Sir H. Lawrence boldly determined to try the effect of a fight in the open, against the mutineers who were then advancing in force on Lucknow from the direction of Fyzabad. He was only able to take out 300 British and 230 Native Infantry, with a few Volunteer Cavalry and 160 Native Sowars, but with ten guns and one eight inch howitzer, manned principally by Natives. The mutineers were about 6,500, exclusive of any armed villagers.

It was a bold, almost a desperate venture, for the Residency and Muchee Bhowun defences had to be held, and the enormous and ill-disposed city of Lucknow to be controlled during his absence ; but boldness often succeeds, and a check to the rebels might even then perhaps have kept the Residency unmolested.

Success, however, was denied to this gallant effort, greatly owing to the defection and treachery of the Oudh Artillerymen who manned six of the field guns engaged, three of which fell into the enemy's hands, and also to the want of courage, or loyalty, displayed by the Native Cavalry arrayed on our side. The losses were enormous and sadly weakened the force that had so much before it ; of the three

hundred of the 32nd, 154 were killed, wounded, or missing, of whom 4 officers and 111 men were killed on the spot, or missing, which, as respects Europeans, meant killed; 172 Europeans, indeed, were killed wounded or missing, of whom 13 were military officers. Of the Natives, 175 were killed or missing, a large number of whom probably had deserted.

Immediately after the retreat from Chinhut, where the fight took place, the Residency was invested, and the siege fairly commenced on the following morning. The reduced force could not hold the detached fort of the Muchee Bhowun as well as the Residency, and during the night of the 30th of June the garrison of the former was withdrawn without loss, bringing off their guns, and blowing up their magazine, which contained 240 barrels of powder and 6,000,000 ball cartridges. The strength of the garrison then left was 927 Europeans and East Indians, and 765 Natives; but the former included no less than 163 non-military persons, brave and most useful, but untrained to arms; and of the Natives 118 were pensioners, many old and decrepit, while the fidelity of all the Natives was not unnaturally a matter of doubt. Indeed, 234 deserted during the siege, though others behaved with a noble devotion.

It is no part of the plan of this lecture to give a history of the ever memorable Defence of Lucknow. Most of you are familiar with its details, but if you are not, I would advise you to read Sir J. Inglis's despatch, giving an account of it. Probably no despatch ever surpassed it in overpowering interest. The siege was full of incidents of a thrilling nature, commencing with the death, to the inexpressible grief of the garrison, of Sir H. Lawrence, who was mortally wounded on the 2nd July by the fragment of a shell fired from the eight inch howitzer captured from us at Chinhut. He died as might have been expected from his life, and left an example behind him of how it is possible to be an earnest Christian, an active and most liberal philanthropist, an accomplished, gallant soldier and an able political and civil Officer; and as Sir John Inglis reported to Government "all ranks possessed such confidence in his ability and fertility of resource, that the news of his fall was received throughout the garrison with feelings of consternation only second to the grief which was impressed on the hearts of all by the loss of a public benefactor and warm friend."

Of the various attacks that were repulsed: of the constant danger from the mines of the enemy: of the anxiety arising from pos-

sible treachery within the garrison : of the noble deeds performed, alike by women and by men, and alike by civilians and by soldiers : of all the privations inseparable from a close investment : of the hope deferred that made the heart sick, when relief was thought to be near at hand and when General Havelock had to fall back to Cawnpore from his gallant but fruitless attempt to reach Lucknow, and when, indeed, he was on the point of falling back to Allahabad,—I shall say nothing.

Of the 927 European and East Indian men present on the 1st of July, only 577 remained alive on the 20th of September, when Generals Havelock and Outram reached, and of these many were sick or wounded. Of 765 Natives, 133 were dead, and 230 had deserted. Thus, in 87 days the garrison had fallen from 1,692 to 1,179, and this included many wounded and sick.

To illustrate the severity of the losses, I may instance the Artillery, which had 9 officers ; of these 5 were killed or wounded, ~~and~~ ^{dead of} ~~One~~ One was three times wounded and survived ; two were once wounded and recovered ; and one alone remained untouched.

Two ladies were killed during the siege, and nine wives of officers and uncovenanted gentlemen died, with no less than 53 European or East Indian children.

We now arrive at the time when the garrison was gladdened by the arrival of succour.

General Havelock, having been reinforced at Cawnpore, crossed the Ganges again on the 19th and 20th September with 3,179 men, Sir J. Outram accompanying him, but, as is well known, declining to take the command from General Havelock until the garrison of Lucknow was relieved.

The force advanced through drenching rain towards Lucknow, and on the 21st the enemy were attacked at Mungulwar and entirely defeated, leaving four guns in our hands. A good number of them were sabred on this occasion by the Volunteer Cavalry, who were headed by Sir James Outram. On the 23rd, the enemy were again defeated at the Alum Bagh, and on the following day all the incumbances and sick were placed in the Alum Bagh, a large walled garden, with a house in the centre, situated about 4 miles from the Residency, and distant nearly two miles from the canal which skirts the city on the Cawnpore side. 250 soldiers with two 9-pounder guns and two heavy guns, with some pieces of Artillery captured from the

enemy, were left under Major MacIntyre of the 78th Highlanders, for the protection of the sick, baggage, and stores ; and on the morning of the 25th September the Force advanced on its arduous duty of relieving the garrison of the Residency.

After carrying the Char Bagh Bridge, progress was found barred by palisades and loop-holed houses on the direct road to the Residency ; and the Force followed the road by the canal, eventually turning to its left towards the Kaiser Bagh. Here it became exposed to a murderous fire and suffered greatly, but by sunset Sir J. Outram and General Havelock, with the Highlanders and Seikhs, had entered the Residency. Many of the Force remained outside in the Palaces for the night, and it was the following evening before the whole of the troops, guns and sick had, with difficulty, been brought within the Residency and the adjacent Palace of Fureed Buksh. Sir H. Havelock declared that what had been effected demanded the efforts of ten thousand good troops, and he compared the obstacles overcome to those encountered in the desperate affairs of Buenos Ayres and Saragossa. Many wounded men had fallen into the hands of the enemy to be barbarously murdered, others had been only just rescued from this fate by the daring gallantry and devotion of their comrades ; 31 Officers and 504 men had been killed or wounded in the advance from Alum Bagh, and 207 had been killed outright from the time the Ganges had been crossed, six days previously. Several valuable officers had fallen, foremost among whom was General Neill of the Madras Fusiliers, who had, as said by Lord Canning in his G. O. "won, during his short but active career in Bengal, the respect and "confidence of the Government of India, and made himself conspicuous as an intelligent, prompt, and gallant soldier, ready of "resource and stout of heart."

The wasted garrison was now reinforced by more than two thousand unwounded men, but neither their trials, nor that of the troops of whom Sir J. Outram now took command, were at an end. It was high time, however, that succour came, for the enemy's mines were becoming dangerous, and the fidelity of the Native soldiers might have given way under a more prolonged and severe trial, when it would have been impossible to hold the position. One shudders to think of what might have happened had not General Havelock's relief taken place, or had it been deferred for even one month.

With the increase in troops, the circuit of the position had to

be enlarged, and the Palaces on the River bank, nearly to the Kaiser Bagh, had to be taken, and held. Various points occupied by the enemy in close proximity to our position had to be captured; and then General Outram had to consider what course he could pursue to carry out the wish of the Government to relieve the garrison and withdraw the women and children. General Outram arrived at the conclusion, which few will now dispute, that if his force reached the Residency with such loss and difficulty, it would be utterly impossible to carry off the sick, wounded, women and children, amounting to 1,500 souls, even if there had been carriage, which there was not.

There were two alternatives: one, to reinforce the Lucknow garrison with some three hundred men, and, leaving everything behind him, to cut his way with the remains of the Infantry to the Alum Bagh; but he rightly rejected this alternative, as, to have adopted it, would have left the garrison in a worse plight than when he arrived, by the addition of a large number of wounded to feed, as well as 300 soldiers, who would have barely sufficed to afford the additional protection required, while the increase would have been insufficient to enable the garrison to make an active defence, ~~and~~ ^{effect} sorties, &c, or to prevent the enemy from occupying the whole of their old positions: and Sir J. Outram considered that with a less body of troops than his force, reduced by these 300 men, it would be next to hopeless to think of getting out, even with severe loss.

He therefore decided on the other alternative; viz. to remain until succour could come, hoping to obtain forced supplies from the city,—a hope never realised; and at all events determined to remain, even on reduced rations, till reinforcements came.

A spy having brought an urgent message from the Alum Bagh detachment, as to their want of provisions, General Outram desired to send them his small Cavalry force, with instructions, if found necessary, to withdraw to Cawnpore; but the enemy were found, at night, when the Cavalry tried to get out, in such force all round, that the attempt had to be abandoned.

Early in October an effort was made to work from house to house along the Cawnpore road, in view to the possibility of communicating with the Alum Bagh. These operations had eventually to be abandoned, after the fall of two senior Officers, Major Haliburton, 78th Highlanders, and Major Stephenson, Madras Fusiliers, and many men.

From this time until the middle of November, the troops were,

in the main, employed in rendering the position more secure, in occasional sorties, where, at particular points, the enemy became very troublesome, in guarding against the enemy's mines, and in driving mines to expel the enemy from various places. In these mining operations the greatest skill and courage were constantly displayed.

Throughout these six weeks there was ever a fire of musketry from the buildings near, and a frequent fire of grape and round shot from guns posted at but a short distance from the position.

The troops, though on short rations, with scanty clothing, and deprived of their usual comforts of spirits, tea, vegetables or tobacco, and thus very liable to disease, behaved admirably. In this period the original garrison sustained a loss of 122, and Sir J. Outram's force of 400, killed and wounded; thus reducing the united force to 2,700 effective Europeans and Natives, of all kinds.

Matters were in this state, and Sir James Outram's force was shut up and closely invested, while the communication between the Alum Bagh and Cawnpore was dangerous and precarious, and there was no prospect of sufficient troops (especially of Cavalry and Field Artillery) being collected at Cawnpore from below for an effectual relief of Lucknow, while every day the Gwalior Contingent, a powerful army in itself, and sure to be a nucleus which many would join, might attack Cawnpore, so weakly held, and render the relief more difficult, for a time, than it had been before. It was generally believed, too, that the provisions of our troops at Lucknow were running short and that they would be in great straits, perhaps have to cut their way out,—which would be a disastrous operation, encumbered as they were,—unless speedily relieved.

Happily, aid was coming from another quarter, which, supplemented by troops from below, eventually solved the difficulty.

Directly Delhi fell, Sir Archdale Wilson sent off a column under Colonel Greathed, who was succeeded after a time by Sir Hope Grant. This column, selected from the remains of the force which besieged and stormed Delhi, amounted to about 1,000 British and 2,000 Natives of all arms, with 16 Guns; and it is worthy of remark, that a force, employed during the very crisis of the mutiny, detached from itself on a most important service another force, in which the Natives were two to one more numerous than the Europeans; and well did the Natives repay the trust reposed in them.

During the Siege of Delhi our rule had disappeared entirely

between Cawnpore and that place, two isolated garrisons alone occupying Meerut and Agra.

The column had therefore first to clear the Doab, and, moving to Bolundshuhur, there defeated a body of mutineers and rebels, captured and blew up the rebel Fort of Malagurh, and re-established civil authority. It then moved to Allyghur, and, after an insignificant fight, expelled the rebels from that city and left there a detachment of Native Cavalry and Infantry. The column then marched down the Trunk Road, surprised and killed some rebel chiefs who held Akrabad, and then, called by urgent appeals for aid from Agra, which expected an attack, turned off across country by Byjygurh to Hatras, and so by a very long forced march to Agra, which its rear had not fairly reached, when an attack was made on it by a large force of mutineers and rebels from Mhow, Indore, &c. After a sharp fight, these were defeated, and their thirteen guns taken, they being pursued for several miles, and many cut up.

Agra thus relieved, the column pushed down country, and, as before reaching Agra, so below that place, visited villages that were known to be obnoxious to our rule, and punished Natives and others who fell into their hands. Mynpoorie was reached, and, its Rajah flying, some two lacs of treasure was recaptured, that originally was in our civil Treasury ; then, proceeding onwards, the temptation of visiting Futtehgurh, some 20 miles off the road, was resisted, as the column, after it had defeated the Nawab there, could not have spared a sufficient force to hold the place, and the service on which it was going was understood to be urgent, and every soldier with it required. At Kanouj a body of the enemy were encountered and defeated by part of the Cavalry and Horse Artillery of the force, and three Guns taken ; alternately then making forced and single marches, this column reached Cawnpore on the 26th of October, and got into communication, by post and telegraph, for the first time for five and a half months, with Calcutta. Need I say with what interest that column viewed Cawnpore, and how British soldier and Punjabee visited the well, roamed through Wheeler's entrenchment and picked up many relics, as scraps of letters, &c., or how they gathered round the stalwart kilted Highlanders of the 93rd, four companies of which had just arrived, for none of that column could before, at all events in Bengal, have ever seen a Highland Soldier. Royal Artillery-men, too, were seen for the first time by most of that column.

Curiosity perhaps was greatest, though its object was not very large, in the case of a real Midshipman, a sort of *avant courier* of Peel and his noble crew,—a Midshipman too, decorated with a Victoria Cross, won at Peel's side at the attack on the Redan. The column after its long marches and after its isolated position when struggling to take Delhi, felt itself in another world.

Nor was the interest all on one side. Those Highlanders and others, fresh from England, looked on the column with astonishment. Sixteen horsed guns, in admirable order, manned by Bengal Artillerymen, who always seemed confident, whatever befell them; a Regiment of British Lancers, which though very much reduced in numbers, turned out every day during a whole year in the field, and marching in a way hardly to be surpassed by a corps at Hounslow; four Squadrons of Native Cavalry of four different Regiments, each squadron led by a young officer, whose name even then was becoming well known as a "sabreur" of distinction;* the men looking fit for any service, and their horses, if somewhat thin, quite up to work; two British Battalions, barely equal each to three Companies, with men dressed in drab, with beards and turbans, so sunburnt that they could hardly be distinguished from the two Punjabee Infantry Regiments, their worthy rivals in many a day of fight. Such a force, coming fresh from Delhi, certainly presented a novel and interesting sight to those who had not previously served in India.

The Commander-in-Chief left Calcutta on the night of the 27th of October. He had up to that time been employed in various preparations for the reception and forwarding up country of the troops coming from England, and in devising plans of operations, and had, in fact, no body of troops anywhere to take command of. He travelled upwards at some risk, narrowly escaping capture below Benares by a body of mutineers; and, inspecting and looking closely into matters at the places he passed, reached Cawnpore on the 3rd November, and at the latter place and at Allahabad arranged for the despatch onwards of Ordnance and Engineer Parks, Commissariat and Medical stores, &c., which were pushed to the front with incredible rapidity. Indeed, no time was to be lost, for though nothing but the most meagre intelligence arrived, it was reported that Sir J. Outram's provisions were nearly exhausted, and that he could only

* Lieutenants Watson, Probyn, Younghusband and H. Gough.

hold out for a few days longer. At the same time measures for strengthening and provisioning Cawnpore were proceeded with.

Meanwhile, under orders from the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hope Grant, with the Delhi column, joined by the four Companies of Highlanders and some detachments, moved from Cawnpore into Oudh on the 30th October, leaving some Cavalry and Horse Artillery to escort Sir Colin onwards when he reached Cawnpore. Sir Hope Grant was ordered to get into communication with the troops at the Alum Bagh, to relieve them of their sick and wounded, and send them back to Cawnpore, and to supply the Alum Bagh garrison with provisions, but to await the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief in a position where he would not be involved in operations against the enemy investing Lucknow. In pursuance of these orders, while changing ground from Bunnee Bridge to Buntera, on the morning of the 2nd November, an engagement took place with a body of the enemy, which resulted in their defeat, and in their losing one gun, after a tolerably lengthened pursuit. The casualties of Sir Hope Grant's force were somewhat under 30.

The next day, a force of all arms went to the Alum Bagh and brought away their sick and wounded, who were sent on under a strong escort to Cawnpore. The number of effective men in the Alum Bagh had been about trebled since Sir J. Outram had entered Lucknow, owing to the recovery of sick men and to the arrival of strong convoys from Cawnpore, which had not all reached without having to fight. The enemy did not venture up close, but continually harassed the troops by a fire from guns planted in advance of the canal, and cut off followers who ventured beyond the walls. For some days, indeed, after Sir J. Outram advanced, and until a convoy arrived, the followers had been exposed to great privations from want of food, and several had been killed who ventured out. The Artillery fire, though annoying, had caused but few casualties.

Some detachments arrived in camp between the 4th and 9th, and on the evening of the latter day Sir Colin and staff rode in, having come 35 miles from Cawnpore, with their escort, at one stretch.

Early on the morning of the 10th, Mr. Kavanagh, a clerk in one of the Lucknow Civil Offices, came up to one of our Cavalry pickets, dressed and disguised as a Native, and revealed himself as a European who had managed to get out of Lucknow, to bring despatches to the Commander-in-Chief. He was accompanied by a faithful and very

intelligent Native. It being most essential that information and advice as to the best mode of relief, and as to the exact position of affairs in our entrenchments should reach Sir Colin Campbell, Mr. Kavanagh volunteered to bring a letter from Sir J. Outram. The service was one of the most extreme peril, for Lucknow was most closely invested. Mr. Kavanagh having, though really very unlike a Native, admirably disguised himself, crossed the Goomtee with his companion soon after dark on the 9th and made his way through the suburbs on that side for some distance, then, recrossing the Goomtee, he passed through Lucknow to the neighbourhood of the Alum Bagh and soon afterwards came across a party of Punjab Cavalry, the Native Officer of which, on ascertaining who he was, and whence he came, gave him a warm welcome, and his perils were over for the time. He had several narrow escapes on the way and his enterprize was as useful as it was dangerous. Mr. Kavanagh's services were certainly most valuable on this occasion and it is pleasing to know that they were not unrewarded. Her Majesty conferred upon him the distinction of the Victoria Cross, he being thus the first non-military man who ever obtained that honour. The Government of India bestowed on him a donation of Rs. 20,000, equal to several years pay at the rate he was then drawing, and promoted him from Clerk in a Civil Office to be an Assistant Commissioner on Rs. 700 a month,—great rewards, but certainly not more than were deserved.

Previously, some proposals from Sir J. Outram on the subject of the Relief had reached us through one or two spies who brought out papers rolled in quills and written in the Greek character. With these before him, and with the information brought by Mr. Kavanagh, Sir Colin Campbell was enabled to mature his plan of operations, which will be seen as we go on, for the plan then prepared was rigidly adhered to throughout in every particular.

It was no easy task that was before the Commander-in-Chief; for when all his reinforcements had closed up, and the posts of Alum Bagh, and another to be established at the Dilkoosha, had been provided for, he would have but 3,500 Infantry and some 400 Cavalry with which to penetrate Lucknow in the face of 30,000 men, reach Sir J. Outram, keep open his rear, and hold a line of posts extending over several miles, for days, each post liable to attack by overwhelming numbers; and to bring away without molestation the 1,500 sick, wounded, women and children, referred to by Sir J. Outram in his

despatch expressing his inability to extricate himself.

It was a difficult enterprise, but felt by every one in the force to be one of the most honourable in which soldiers could be employed. Men from Delhi somewhat worn and weary after 6 months campaigning and continual strain of mind and body, revived at the thought of being sharers in an enterprise so congenial to every feeling of humanity and chivalry. How the enterprise was performed it is my chief object this night to tell you.

Some detachments had to close up on the 10th and 11th, and meanwhile the telegraphic wire was, at some risk to those engaged in the work, being brought from Cawnpore to Camp. On the afternoon of the 11th, Sir Colin reviewed his little army and seemed very well satisfied with their appearance. He praised the troops from Delhi, complimented, most justly, the 9th Lancers on their admirable conduct throughout the war and on their splendid appearance, and renewed his acquaintance with the Bengal Horse Artillery, one of the two troops of which he had last seen when employed under his personal command in an expedition against the Hill Tribes in the Peshawur Valley in 1852.

At sunrise next morning the troops advanced, and within an hour the advanced guard was attacked by a body of the enemy with guns, which opened from the right of the road. A short fight ensued, in which only the advanced guard was engaged, with the exception of the Bengal field Battery under Captain Bourchier, which coming rapidly up, silenced the enemy's guns, which were then removed, but captured after a pursuit and charge by the squadron of Hodson's Horse under Lieutenant H. Gough.

The camp was pitched close to the Alum Bagh enclosure, which was pretty well filled by the troops and followers occupying it. The enemy to some extent invested that place, and kept up a desultory fire of Artillery on the enclosure, so that the first position marked out for the camp had to be changed, as the round shot of the enemy fell within it.

On the 13th, various arrangements had to be made. The 75th Foot, not 300 strong, and much fatigued by hard service, was placed in the Alum Bagh, forming, with 50 men of the Seikh Regiment of Ferozepore and a detachment of Artillery under Captain Moir, its entire garrison.

All men out of hospital belonging to Sir J. Outram's British Regiments were taken out of the Alum Bagh, and, joined to men of their corps in our camp, formed two small battalions of detachments.

All the tents were placed in the Alum Bagh enclosure, and some other measures taken to lessen the encumbrances of Sir Colin's force. A semaphore was erected in the Alum Bagh and some communications were held with the Residency, where a similar semaphore had been constructed. A code of signals had previously been received from Sir J. Outram. A force was sent to render the Fort of Jellalabad, which commanded the road between the Alum Bagh and the Dilkoosha, untenable, the enemy having evacuated it.

During the 13th, and as the Force was marching off on the 14th, the last reinforcements joined. Among them was the Military Train, mounted and equipped as four troops of Cavalry, two very efficient guns of Madras Native Horse Artillery, and a Company of Madras Sappers.

On the evening of the 13th Sir Colin Campbell made a reconnoissance.

The troops breakfasted early, and then started from the right of the camp through the fields, making a wide circuit, towards the Dilkoosha, the well-known garden-house of the King of Oudh, situated in the park of the same name, about 3 or 4 miles from the Residency. Though tents were left behind, a large amount of transport was required for fourteen days provisions and for the ammunition, so the rear guard was very strong, and was often engaged during the day in protecting this great convoy across country. It was late at night before the rear had closed up.

Meanwhile the advance saw parties of the enemy and some slight skirmishing took place, especially as it neared the Dilkoosha park enclosure, but Cavalry and Horse Artillery pushing through an opening in the Park wall, and the Infantry skirmishers advancing, the palace itself was abandoned by the enemy, who ran towards the Martinière college, situated on lower ground, nearly a mile from the Dilkoosha and close to the River Goomtee.

When the Cavalry and Horse Artillery reached the brow of the slope after a canter across the park, the sight looking down the hill was very animated. Some of the enemy were still running down the hill to join their comrades at the Martinière. This large, lofty and fantastic building had groups of Sepoys all about it, bustling

hither and thither, and evidently surprised at our having arrived so soon. They were trying to get one or two guns to bear upon the Cavalry, which shortly opened, but some of our Infantry and the heavy guns of the Royal Artillery quickly coming up, after some rounds from the latter, the 1st Battalion of detachments and 8th Foot skirmished down the hill and carried the Martinière, the enemy beating a precipitate retreat across the canal. In the course of this affair, the Squadron 1st Punjaub Cavalry, pursuing some of the enemy, came on a party of their horse, and a hand to hand combat ensued in which their leader, a fine Native Officer of the 15th Irregular Cavalry was killed by Lieutenant Watson, the distinguished leader of the Squadron; Lieutenant Watson himself having a narrow escape from the Ressaldar, who fired his pistol at Watson within a few feet.

On the left flank, too, the enemy were in force, while this direct attack was being made on the Martinière, and had to be held in check by the fire of a half battery of Bengal Artillery that came up.

Head Quarters and the bulk of the Force then were established at, and in front of the Martinière, a body of troops at the Dilkoosha, and another in the left front, facing the canal, whence an attack in force was apprehended. Here was posted a Field Battery and two of Captain Peel's heavy guns.

There were no tents, and the troops remained at their arms. The Commander-in-Chief and Staff speedily mounted to the top of the lofty Martinière, accompanied by Mr. Kavanagh, and drank in the splendid panorama of Lucknow, with the Kaiser Bagh and other places known to be held by the enemy, and with the distant Residency and adjacent Palaces on the line of the River Goomtee, held by our beleaguered troops. A semaphore was at once ordered to be constructed on the top of the Martinière to inform Sir J. Outram of our plans, and by its means, on the 15th, the Garrison knew we should advance on the morrow.

This survey of Sir Colin's had hardly been completed when the enemy came down, and, occupying the huts and cover on the Lucknow side of the canal, opened fire on our troops in the Martinière garden; some also made their appearance on our right, whence, however, they were soon driven. The fire from the direction of the canal was at times heavy, but our troops were at first simply confined to holding their own. A little later and towards sunset, parties of the 53rd Foot and 4th Punjaub Infantry pushed in a spirited way across the

canal, and drove the enemy from the huts beyond it. The struggle then ceased for the night, but we had sustained a loss of two officers killed, and several men killed and wounded.

The night passed away quietly, the men sleeping at their arms, the whole force being as it were on picket, as they continued, indeed, for ten days.

On the 15th, all preparations were made for a final advance into Lucknow on the following morning. Provisions were served out to be carried by the men, every article of baggage was stored at the Dilkoosha, into which the sick and wounded were removed; some defences were constructed around that building, and a force was told off to remain there, of five field guns, half the 9th Lancers, the Military Train, a Squadron of Punjaub Cavalry, and the 8th Foot about 300 strong, all under Brigadier Little, commanding the Cavalry.

In the afternoon the enemy made a demonstration on our right, but were rapidly opposed by the two Madras Native Horse Artillery guns which drove them off in good style.

With the morrow came the advance, and before describing this I may relate first, what sort of force it was that was to be now so actively employed for several days; secondly, I will describe the plan of the Commander of the force, and then devote a few words to the Commander himself.

The Artillery consisted of, first, those sixteen guns, before stated to have come from Delhi, a tried, though as respects men and horses, sadly reduced body, but equal to any emergency; next, a Horse Battery of Royal Artillery, the first horsed guns of the Royal Regiment that I believe ever engaged an enemy in India: one Company of Royal Artillery, with four heavy guns, and one Company of Royal Artillery equipped with mortars. This was the Artillery of the army; but the force had the novel addition of Naval Artillery, 800 miles from the sea; 250 of the Shannon's crew, seamen and marines, under Peel, manned 8 heavy guns and howitzers, with bullock draft, and two rocket tubes mounted on light hackeries; not only did they man these pieces, but their marines, and a body of seamen, armed with Rifles, formed a formidable escort of Infantry, commanded by a man whose untimely death by small pox, within a few months, just as he was recovering from a severe wound received at the Capture of Lucknow, was mourned by England; the son of one of England's greatest statesmen, himself a bold, active, enterprising, scientific, modest officer, who never made difficulty,



and one of the most charming of companions, ~~This~~ Naval Brigade, perfect in every thing, was indeed a most valuable portion of the Force.

We thus had 34 guns and howitzers, 6 mortars and two rocket tubes; Ordnance, large out of all proportion to the other arms, but of infinite value in assailing the strongholds that lay in our path, and in making up for our deficiencies in Infantry.

The Engineer department, under a subaltern of Royal Engineers, new to the country, but senior officer present, and equal to his novel position, was composed of a splendid company of Royal Engineers, a company of Madras Sappers, a few faithful Bengal Sappers fresh from Delhi, and two companies of newly raised Punjaub Pioneers.

Two squadrons of Lancers, and three of Punjaub Horse, formed the Cavalry; a force not of much use in Lucknow, but valuable to keep open, to a certain extent, the road to the Dilkoosha.

Of the Infantry only one Regiment was really complete with all its companies, viz., the magnificent Sutherland Highlanders, one of the Colonels of which, Adrian Hope, to whom all looked with admiration and regard, soon to fall alas before an insignificant fort in Oudh, commanded the only complete Brigade of Infantry, which was made up by the 93rd and a wing of the 53rd Regiment,—hardy soldiers, experienced in Indian warfare, and full of zeal and pluck; and the 4th Punjaub Infantry, weak in numbers, but gallant, forward soldiers, well worthy of being associated with the 53rd and 93rd; a weak Battalion of detachments of three of the corps shut up in Lucknow completed this Brigade.

The two other Brigades under Brigadiers Greathed and Russell, were not of the size of good Regiments; the first had a battalion of detachments of three corps shut up in Lucknow, and the 2nd Punjaub Native Infantry, a tried Regiment from Delhi; the second was composed of the Head Quarters of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, now to see its first Indian field, though its colours were covered with the names of other wars, from Minden to Sebastopol; and a detachment of the 82nd Regiment. About 3,500 Infantry in all were thus employed.

The plan sketched out by its Commander for this force was, to advance with the right as close as possible to the river, thereby securing that flank against onslaught, though not against fire; carry and hold all posts up to the position occupied by the force under Sir J. Outram; hold a succession of posts on the left, so as to keep a clear road,—a road clear, save from fire,—from the Residency to the

open country; bring off all our troops, sick, wounded, women, and treasure, and such guns and stores as might be thought proper; destroy the rest; evacuate the Residency; draw off the troops first to the Martinière and Dilkosha and then to the Alum Bagh; establish them in the open country, leaving a force to threaten Lucknow until an army could be got together for its capture; then hurry off with all encumbrances to Cawnpore, where it was anticipated aid would be urgently wanted; and, having placed the women and sick in security, act as might be needed.

This was a difficult programme to be carried out, when we recollect that there were perhaps 30,000 men to oppose the British force; that the enemy held many strong positions; and that want of provisions rendered it absolutely necessary to carry out all within a limited period, to say nothing of the necessity which arose, as anticipated, of hurrying to Cawnpore to save that place and garrison.

Having described the force and said what it was to do, a few words may not inaptly be devoted to the Commander. Sir Colin Campbell was not then to see hard fighting for the first time. As a subaltern at Vimiera and at Corunna, he first came under fire; at Walcheren, at Barossa, at Tarifa, at Vittoria, and at St. Sebastian, he had been well tried. At the unsuccessful assault of the latter fortress he led a party of chosen men from the light companies of the Regiments employed. As Napier says "it was in vain that Lieutenant "Campbell, breaking through the tumultuous crowd, with the survivors "of his chosen detachment, mounted the ruins; twice he ascended, "twice he was wounded, and all around him died." With his wounds unhealed, he followed up the Army, and was again wounded at the Bidassoa.

Sent to America at the conclusion of that war, he missed Waterloo, and, save at the suppression of an insurrection in the West Indies, saw no more field service until he commanded a Regiment and then a Brigade in China in 1842, though he was actively employed in England shortly before that, in command of the 98th, during Chartist disturbances. Coming to India in 1846, he was in command of the Lahore garrison when the Punjaub war broke out, and took the field in command of a Division with which he served at Ramnugur, Sadoolapore, Chilianwallah, and Goojerat; at Chilianwallah being mainly instrumental with his division in driving the Seikhs, who had broken the centre of our army, from the field; and receiving a sabre

wound in a personal encounter when charging the enemy's guns. He was present in the last part of Sir W. Gilbert's pursuit of the Afghans after Goojerat, and commanded at Peshawur for nearly three years, where he was often engaged in expeditions against the hill tribes. He went as a General Officer to the Crimea, and commanded the Highland Brigade at the Alma; commanded the force protecting Balaclava on the 25th October 1854; and subsequently, until Sebastopol fell, was in command of a Division composed of the Brigades of Guards and Highlanders. With such experience, he was selected for the chief command in India, when General Anson died at the beginning of the mutiny, and if he possessed large experience, extending over a service of half a century, his vigour was quite unimpaired, and few young men could stand harder work. With all these services to boast of, and with others of a date after the events we are now relating, there can be none that reflect such lustre on his career as that of the "Relief of Lucknow." Ably planned, the enterprise was carried out according to the plan in every particular, despite all obstacles; and whether we look at the result, or to the execution, he must be very critical indeed who finds fault.

In fact all contingencies were provided against, save failure on the part of the troops to carry, or to hold the positions allotted to them. It was alike impossible and unnecessary to do this. Impossible, because there were no men to spare as reserves; unnecessary, for no General ever had troops more resolute, or more certain to carry out whatever they were ordered to do.

As soon as the men had breakfasted on the 16th, the force advanced to its right front, leaving some Cavalry and Brigadier Greathed with his Infantry and guns facing the line of the canal, to protect the left rear of the advancing force, until it had become fairly engaged, and then to draw off to the right and to follow in rear of the main column.

The route to be taken was very little known, but a native guide volunteered to lead to the Secunder Bagh, and we were aided by the general knowledge of the locality possessed by Mr. Kavanagh. Crossing the canal, various gardens were passed, and in advancing up the narrow street of a village, the advanced guard, on making a turn to its left, came under a fire of musketry from a few men in some huts, at the back of which we could see was the Secunder Bagh.

The situation was critical and the fire heavy, and the enemy, both in the Secunder Bagh and outside, in great force. A gun from the advanced guard was run up a bank between two huts and opened on the Secunder Bagh, while the men of the 53rd, on advance guard, dashed forward on both sides of the Secunder Bagh, and compelled the retirement within it of such of the enemy as were close to it; but in front towards the Kaiser Bagh, on the left front towards the Barracks, and on the left in huts, the enemy were in force, and kept up a continual fire, as did also those in the Secunder Bagh. The Bengal Troop of Horse Artillery, on advanced guard, extricated itself from the narrow lane in which it was jammed, by dashing its horses sharp to the right up a steep bank, and came into action in the open space I point to. The guns had to be turned in three directions; and now, in addition to musketry, cannon opened from the Kaiser Bagh, and the round shot fell amongst our troops, but the musketry fire was most deadly, especially from the huts within a few yards of the left of the troop. Some of the 93rd rushing up, under Sir Colin's directions, sprang on to the roofs of the huts, tore them open, for they were walled in on that side, and drove the enemy out, following them and eventually capturing and holding the Barracks, where they remained, but on which a constant fire was kept up by the enemy.

The casualties were heavy, and the Commander-in-Chief himself was severely struck on the leg by a musket ball, that first passed through the body of a gunner of the troop. Meanwhile, with great exertions, a gun and a howitzer of the heavy field battery Royal Artillery ~~was~~ dragged by ropes up the steep bank, and breached the Secunder Bagh within 60 yards. The Battery had its Captain killed and senior Subaltern wounded. As soon as a hole large enough was made, the place was stormed, entrance being effected almost at the same moment by the gate. The Highlanders, and 53rd, and 4th Punjaub Infantry, and some of the detachments, were alike distinguished in this enterprise. Within, a fearful slaughter ensued. Few people ever saw any thing to compare with it. From within an enclosure 150 yards square, over 2,000 dead bodies of the enemy were afterwards brought out and buried. No one who saw it can forget the scene. Over the gateway some of the Sepoys made a stand, and a desperate fight ensued between them and the Seikhs, who mounted by a narrow staircase, and shooting and bayoneting them, hurled them to the ground below. In a room in the centre of the garden, dead and wounded, some of

them with their clothes on fire, lay piled to the height of a yard or more, often the wounded below the dead struggling to get out; and when the slaughter ceased at that point, dying men were known to raise themselves up, to pour foul abuse on any passing British Officer. Their's, indeed, was enmity till death. Nearly all in the Secunder Bagh were mutineer Sepoys. It was believed that only four men of the garrison escaped, for the place was soon surrounded by our men, and of the few who dropped from the walls and ran when they saw defence was hopeless, the majority were shot down by our Infantry.

It was hours before all firing ceased in the Secunder Bagh, for in one of the towers they held out for long, and shot several of our men who tried to get at them, but before these were killed, operations were being carried on still further in advance. Huts on our left front were carried by the Infantry, and a curious tomb on an eminence to the right front, was occupied by some of the 2nd Punjab Native Infantry, while the mortar battery and naval guns opened on the Shah Nujeef, a handsome white-domed tomb, surrounded by an extensive court yard with double walls.

All this time, cannon ^{shot} from the Kaiser Bagh and from the ^{left} ~~right~~ bank of the Goomtee plunged at intervals among our troops, and one ammunition cart of the sailors was blown up.

The afternoon was passing away, and it seemed essential to carry the Shah Nujeef, so the 93rd were led by Sir Colin Campbell in person, under a heavy fire, to some cover in close proximity to the walls, while some of the Naval guns, dragged by the seamen and ~~the~~ men of the Madras Fusiliers, were brought close to the walls, and commenced to breach. The enemy appeared to lose heart and to fly out on the other side, and eventually an entrance was effected without difficulty; but while the troops were still outside and under a heavy fire, the Horse Battery of the Royal Artillery came up between the Mess House and Shah Nujeef, and cannonaded the latter at a very short distance, with great effect, exposed all the time to a heavy musketry fire from the enemy's Infantry occupying the Mess House compound.

The Shah Nujeef was garrisoned by Highlanders, and night now came on. The troops lay down in line with their arms in their hands, the head quarters and those of the Infantry who were not holding the huts ~~at~~ the Shah Nujeef, Barracks &c. lining the road extending from the Secunder Bagh towards the Barracks; the field hospital with its

numerous wounded, being established in the huts opposite the Secunder Bagh. A cold, comfortless night was passed after a day of toil, nor was it passed without any disturbance, for long before dawn a great beating of drums, &c., on the part of the enemy, seemed to indicate an attack; but they did not come on, and we afterwards learned that the Residency had been constantly treated during the siege to this noisy demonstration.

I may here mention that whilst we were engaged in the attack on the Shah Nujeeb, the troops under Sir J. Outram had captured some positions nearer to us, and were annoying the enemy as far as possible by the fire of mortars and guns.

On the 17th, fire was opened on the Mess House, a large masonry building surrounded by a wall and ditch; but before an advance was made, it seemed necessary to secure our left, where there were many of the enemy, who, avoiding our post at the Barracks, might cut in on our left rear. It was determined to carry and to convert into military posts the five Bungalows on the road from Banks's House to the Residency, and also to occupy Banks's House. These operations were very difficult. They were aided by Artillery and rockets, but it was the 18th before all was secure in this quarter, and the object was not effected without loss. Colonel Biddulph, Deputy Quarter Master General, who was most conspicuous in this service, was shot through the head, and fell down with a face as calm as if he had slept; and Brigadier Russell had his neck very badly contused by a cannon shot. Banks's House, a most dangerous position, for it might have been overwhelmed before succour could reach, was held from that time and throughout the Relief by 50 Punjaub Infantry under a young officer.*

In the course of the afternoon the Mess House was carried, and as from hence we could see the British flag flying on the positions captured by Sir J. Outram the previous day, a regimental colour was planted on the turret of the Mess House. The fire of Artillery from the Kaiser Bagh was however so heavy, that the pole was twice shot away by round shot.

No building but the Motee Mahul, now remained between Sir Colin's force and the position held by Sir J. Outram, but the road between the two was swept by grape and musketry from the Kaiser Bagh. Openings were made in the walls of the Mess House compound, and, watching their opportunity, our men ran across, in small

*Lieutenant Keen, 2nd P. I.

groups or singly, to the shelter of a wall, and now the Motee Mahul was ours, and the communication between the forces complete, though so dangerous, that three of the Staff Officers who accompanied Sir J. Outram and General Havelock when they came across from the Engine House to see Sir Colin, were shot down. The meeting of these veteran Chiefs, amid the roar of cannon, and the patter of musketry was a sight well worthy of the picture that represents it. On Sir J. Outram privation had not told so heavily, but the hand of death was on General Havelock, though he lighted up a little on being told for the first time that he was Sir Henry.

Curiosity led some of the Officers of the Relieving Force to run the gauntlet of fire and enter the British position. Already some of the men were getting into communication with Sir Colin's soldiers in the Motee Mahul on the all-important topic of whether they could procure any tobacco or rum, of which they had been so long deprived.

In the ragged summer clothing in which they had entered, these men looked worn and hungry, and in one corner was seen the curious spectacle—I suppose common enough in the garrison—of a British Soldier making chuppaties for himself out of his scanty allowance of flour. Entering a Battery which was trying to silence some of the enemy's guns across the river, these officers saw a few men grimed with smoke and without coat or waistcoat, all so alike in costume and appearance, that it was only by asking which was the officer, that they ascertained they were standing close to one they well knew, — one of the bravest officers of the Bengal Artillery.

It was some time after communications were opened before the Motee Mahul, which is a large enclosure, had been fully cleared of the enemy, who till dusk occasionally fired from different buildings.

During the night the troops of the relieving force again lay by their arms, strong detachments holding the Motee Mahul and the Mess House. The latter, indeed, was exposed to attack at any time from the Kaiser Bagh, in whose extensive squares were many thousand of the enemy; subsequently the Tara Kotee, or Observatory in advance of the Mess House, had to be taken and held. Up to the 18th, in these operations of Sir Colin's force, 45 Officers and 496 men had fallen, while of the Artillery horses alone, 60 had been shot.

During the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd, the troops were disposed as shewn in the accompanying plan, to cover and protect the

withdrawal of all the women, children, sick, wounded, ammunition, treasure, stores, &c. All guns not intended to be taken away, and not required to be kept in position till the last, were gradually burst. A battery of Naval guns was established near Martin's House, 800 yards from the Kaiser Bagh, and plied that stronghold of the enemy with shot, shell, and rockets, until the garrison was withdrawn, mortars also played from the Mess House, and guns and mortars from Sir J. Outram's position. A flying sap was constructed between the Engine House and Martin's House to protect the women and children as they were withdrawn, the space being swept by round shot and musketry from the Kaiser Bagh. From the Motee Mahul to the Kaiser Bagh the road was exposed to a fire of round shot on both flanks, but principally from the opposite side of the river. Happily no woman or child was touched, though I believe more than one native servant of the garrison was killed in coming out. The garrison had no transport, and cattle of Sir Colin's force had to be brought up from Dilkoosha, and used to take away everything from the entrenchment. The enemy threatened the Dilkoosha, and managed to kill some camp followers. Nothing indeed could move with safety between the Secunder Bagh and Dilkoosha, save with a powerful escort; and the Cavalry was incessantly employed between the two places. Indeed, the weakness of the Dilkoosha gave cause for anxiety, especially as all we had come to rescue began to be moved there; and as a small detachment of troops was known to have reached the Alum Bagh, a portion of the 75th Regiment was ordered up to strengthen the weak force of Infantry at the former. On the 22nd, the enemy came on to the attack, but were driven off by Brigadier Little with the Artillery and Cavalry.

During these five days, from the 18th to 22nd, all the troops continued out in the open, and though the casualties were comparatively few, there were often demonstrations of attack to be met; a fire of musketry was more or less going on always at the posts on the left, and there were seldom many minutes without a round shot coming in, mainly from the guns across the river, for those in the Kaiser Bagh were greatly silenced after Peel fairly opened on that place. On the evening of the 18th a smart attack was made on the pickets in front of the centre, and only two companies of Infantry were available to support them, but a Troop of Bengal Horse Artillery being also brought up, the enemy were beaten off; the fire was heavy

and the sight of the flashes of the cannon and musketry in the dusk of the evening was striking in the extreme.

One naval gun, commanded by Midshipman Lord Arthur Clinton, was placed in the open, on the road between the Secunder Bagh and Motee Mahul, and whenever a gun opened so as to command the road, replied to it, and never failed for a time to silence it.

One of the most urgent matters in hand was to bury the 2,000 of the enemy in the Secunder Bagh, for as most of our troops were close to that place, it was felt that if this was not done, a pestilence would break out. Fortunately a recently dug ditch, partly encircling the place, rendered this repulsive task tolerably easy, and the ditch being filled up, ladies soon passed over the bodies without being aware of what was below them.

It was a rough life that Sir Colin's force passed during these days, but exciting and interesting in the highest degree. As Officers could be spared for an hour or two, they went to see the Residency and to offer their services, or any little comfort they possessed, to their friends within. All marvelled at the weak defences so stoutly held, and round which the enemy were still in force. From the look-out post on the top of the Residency, where bullets still came if the look-out Officer exposed himself for an instant, the sight was wonderful, and crowds of horse and foot were constantly passing and repassing on the stone bridge far above the Residency. We learnt now of all the losses; saw what brave women had undergone; and, had, in many cases, to tell them of the loss of dear friends in other parts of India; in others, to rejoice their hearts by tidings of welfare.

At other times amongst our troops there was the excitement of spies being captured and shot, or of some mischief from round shot. On one occasion some of us were sitting down to a hasty breakfast under a tree, when as my Khidmutgar was coming up, with his plates and cups, &c., tied up as usual in a table napkin, a round shot came into the middle of the bundle with a thundering crash, sent every thing flying into the air, and sent the Khidmutgar flying also, quite unhurt, but much alarmed, amid roars of laughter, to some friendly shelter, whence he did not venture to emerge for many hours.

I well remember one day finding myself alongside of Peel's coxswain, who was ever in attendance on his beloved Captain, and asking him how he was getting on. "Well Sir," he said "these are the "hardest times I ever see, Sir; why Sir, will you believe it, the Captain

"even has not had a sprinkle for the last week." This, was to him the most convincing proof of the hardness of the times, for truly Peel was under ordinary circumstances, a very pattern of neatness. At the risk of giving offence I cannot refrain from repeating that this said coxswain confided to us that he was disappointed in the looks of the female portion of the garrison when they passed out; indeed, he said he thought they "looked a rough lot." Poor creatures! their dress may not as a rule have been very attractive and they may have looked worn and sad, but either the coxswain was a bad judge, or he judged too much by dress, for certainly, if I may venture on so bold an opinion, there were among the number ladies who then were, and who still are, among the most admired as well as the most gentle of their sex.

While alluding to the coxswain, I am reminded of another sailor. When we captured the Shah Nujeef it was dark, and I did not see the interior of the building until the following morning. I was struck with the marble floor and one or two handsome chandeliers, as well as with a glass tiger, all in perfect order. Happening to return in about half an hour, I met a friend who had not been there before, and proposed to him to go inside to see the place. To my utter astonishment I found every thing smashed, including, to a great extent, the floor. The cause of all this destruction was not far to seek, for in one corner a burly sailor was still engaged in *heaving* (as he called it) a 24lb shot at everything in the place that was capable of being broken by such gentle means. Upon my asking his particular reason for exerting himself in this way,—and he must have been at it for some time,—he seemed rather surprised, but alleged with the utmost frankness "that he really could not stand the idolatry of these fellows" and so thought it incumbent on him, as a consistent Christian, to do his best to smash everything in the place; and, as far as he could, to smash the place itself.

But I must pass on to the evacuation by the women and children, which is of course in some respects *the* event of the Relief. As before stated, in one most exposed place, a flying sap had been constructed, in others, walls of tents or other mode of concealment had been put up, so that, as far as the Motee Mahul, the enemy might not see the women passing out, and thus, though they were within shot, be ignorant where to aim, or when to fire. Some were brought out packed in different conveyances, but many walked. This was on the

19th, and by sunset all were collected at the Secunder Bagh, the earliest having come out about noon. Once at the Secunder Bagh, the Commander-in-Chief and those about him did their best to make all comfortable. Some bread and butter and tea was procured with difficulty and handed round, and the Commander-in-Chief himself, who not long before had received a packet of English newspapers, went round and distributed them to the ladies.

A few were bright and happy, but the majority looked sad, for they had left behind them for ever in this world, husbands, lovers, children, and felt bewildered at coming forth again into a world which now seemed blank.

The enemy appeared to know of the assemblage here, for more than one cannon shot crashed into the walls of the Secunder Bagh while the ladies were there.

Soon after dark, it having been ascertained that at sunset the road to the rear was clear of the enemy, doolies were provided for all, and under a strong escort this most valuable of convoys started for the Dilkoosha, and arrived there in safety, when they were made as comfortable as circumstances would permit by the Officers of the 9th Lancers and others.

Everything being cleared out, it was arranged that the troops should be withdrawn on the night of the 22nd, and on that day some of Sir Colin's force paid a last visit to the Residency and Palace. A visit to any empty and recently-evacuated house awakens some melancholy, but how much more was this feeling aroused by a glance around those empty rooms, in which many had died, and in which for months tender ladies and young children had gone through hardships with the continual spectacle of death before them. Paucity of transport had caused much that would ordinarily be thought of value, to be left behind, and all kinds of articles were scattered about in profusion. To shew how difficult it was to bring away property, I may mention that I found an Army Surgeon, an old friend, lamenting over his books that had been his companions for years of life in all parts of the world; and right glad was I to be able to place a man at his disposal to bring away as many as could be carried. In one large underground room, the women of the 32nd had been quartered, and here were strewed about workboxes, little books, dresses, &c. The place, indeed, looked desolate, but the men of the garrison still were there watching at their posts, and the dull sound of cannon being

burst, came on the ear at frequent intervals. This process was not altogether a pleasant one to those who had to visit the Residency; for, owing I presume to the difficulty of exactly calculating the proper charge of powder, sometimes large fragments of the cannon flew to great distances, and one of the staff of Sir Colin's force being sent with a message, had just entered the Residency gate, when he was startled by the noise of something thundering through the air, and the next instant felt his horse struck down under him by a huge fragment of a cannon.

At last the moment came to draw off, and not a man in the Force can have failed to feel a deep interest, I might almost say anxiety, as to whether all would pass off without mishap. Silence was impressed on all as indispensable. The most advanced posts of the Residency, and entrenchments, were to fall back first, and pass through those behind them. Gradually thus all the original garrison, and General Outram's force, would pass the advanced parties of Sir Colin's troops at the Motee Mahul and Mess House, then these latter would retire, followed by the detachments at and about the Shah Nujeeb, all passing through a line of Infantry and guns, under the Commander-in-Chief himself, drawn up just in advance of the Secunder Bagh.

At midnight the first move took place, and before 1 A. M. the quiet approach of troops was heard by the Head Quarters Staff, and the head of Sir J. Outram's column passed silently through the line of Sir Colin's troops, and down the narrow lane by which Sir Colin had advanced, to take up a position facing the canal and in front of the Dilkosha. Perhaps for an hour Infantry and Artillery silently passed along, and then Sir J. Outram reported that his Force had all withdrawn. A few minutes were given to let them clear out of the narrow lanes in rear, and the advanced part of Sir Colin's Force under Brigadier the Honorable Adrian Hope silently fell back, and passed through the line. Just as this was in progress, the enemy opened fire from several pieces of cannon and with musketry, and for a minute or two all thought the retirement was discovered, and that we should have the enemy emerging from the Kaiser Bagh, and perhaps passing through the palaces so lately held by us, and falling on our diminished force, now placed at a great disadvantage by the evacuation of so many posts in its front. A rocket cart of the Naval Brigade was still in front, and a fire of rockets was at once turned on the Kaiser

Bagh. This seemed to satisfy the enemy, for their fire ceased, without the retirement of our troops being for a moment checked. It was some false alarm that had produced their fire, and no suspicion of what we were doing, for it was long past daylight in the morning before they discovered what had really happened, and ventured into the Residency. Indeed, the persistent cannonade kept up during the day on the Kaiser Bagh, led them to think that, although we were removing encumbrances from the Residency, as they could not fail to perceive, we were breaching preparatory to an assault on the Kaiser Bagh.

All the advanced posts having moved through the line, orders were sent by Staff Officers to the posts on the left, to fall back straight on the Dilkoosha, by a road that had been explored, and with which officers from those posts had been required to make themselves familiar. At the same time the Artillery with the Commander-in-Chief, filed off to the rear, and none but a handful of Infantry left with the Commander-in-Chief remained, and if the enemy came on them, there would have been stiff work to extricate this body; but no stir appeared, and as soon as time had been given for the guns to get clear of the lanes and village, the Infantry who had been lying down, and gazing with anxious eyes, and ears on the stretch, in the direction of the enemy, quietly arose and filed off through the village with the Commander-in-Chief.

Shortly before dawn every soldier was in the position allotted to him, either at the Dilkoosha, in front of it facing the canal, or at the Martinière, at which latter place Sir Colin and the 93rd were established, and warming themselves round fires soon lighted on the terrace, in rear of that building.

All was now secure and every one rejoiced. Once outside, established as we were, if the enemy had been ten times as numerous we could beat them and keep our convoy safe. One little speck of anxiety was confined to the few who knew that, for days past, all communication had ceased with Cawnpore; auguring that something was amiss there, where we had to look for provisions and for the final means of securing the safety of our charge.

The sun had not long risen when the Martinière seemed to give a heave, and the dull sound of an explosion in the vaults below, warned us that there were perils other than those of the bullets of the enemy. Some Highlanders, searching for wood in the vaults,

dropped a spark on a stock of mutineers' abandoned ammunition, and in an instant these splendid men, either dead or writhing in intense agony, were carried off to the Field Hospital at the Dilkoosha.

During the 23rd, much had to be done in the way of allotting carriage &c.; sending to those Regiments in Sir J. Outram's force the men belonging to them who had come up with the Commander-in-Chief, and organizing the women and children into a sort of Corps under two married officers, who were to allot them to carts, look after them on the march, communicate to them all necessary orders, point out to them their proper position in camp, draw their rations, &c.

The Commander-in-Chief this day thanked the troops for all they had accomplished, alluding to their valour in attack, and to the movement of the previous night, by which the final rescue of the Garrison was effected, which he declared to have been "a model "of discipline and exactness, the consequence of which was, that "the enemy was completely deceived, and the Force retired by a "narrow tortuous lane, the only line of retreat open, and in the "face of 50,000 enemies, without molestation."

On the ~~evening~~^{morning} of the 24th the Commander-in-Chief, with all the women and children and a large portion of the wounded and stores, marched to the Alum Bagh, leaving Sir J. Outram, reinforced by Horse Artillery and Cavalry, in position in front of the Dilkoosha. Next morning, carriage, which was insufficient for all to move at once, having been sent back to Sir J. Outram, that officer marched to the Alum Bagh also, bringing everything that had not accompanied Sir Colin. A demonstration of an attack was made by the enemy as Sir J. Outram commenced to move, but it came to nothing.

On the 24th Sir Henry Havelock, who had been sick for some days, expired at the Dilkoosha, and on the morning of the 25th was buried in the Alum Bagh enclosure. This is not the place to sketch the history of that veteran Christian soldier, who had served wherever there was war in India for five and thirty years, who had seen the deadly campaigns in Burmah of 1824-25-26; been in Afghanistan from the Capture of Ghuznee to the evacuation by Pollock, including taking a very prominent part in the defence of Jellalabad; and been on the staff of Lord Gough against the Mahrattas and the Seikhs. The toil, the exposure, the anxiety, and the privations of the service, from the day he took the field at Allahabad in July 1857, up to the time when he might have hoped for some rest after the withdrawal

from the Residency, were too much for a frame never very strong. Differing from Sir H. Lawrence in character in some respects, they were friends of many years, and alike earnest Christians, alike nobly perished in a rigid discharge of duty.

During the 26th, arrangements were made for equipping General Outram's force as far as possible, and it was arranged that he, with his force made up to 4,000 men of all arms, with 25 guns and howitzers, and 10 mortars, should remain at the Alum Bagh, thus threatening Lucknow from a secure position in the open country until the Commander-in-Chief should come back for the capture of that great city, and reconquest of the country.

A post had already been established at Bunnee Bridge some 10 miles in rear of the Alum Bagh, of a wing of a Madras Regiment and two guns, reinforced shortly by a detachment of British Infantry from Sir J. Outram's camp. At 11 A. M. on the 27th, the remainder of the troops including the wasted remnant of the 32nd Regiment, and of the Native Corps in Lucknow, (now formed into one small Battalion called the Regiment of Lucknow,) and the immense convoy started. Amongst the troops were placed the remnant of the few faithful pensioners who had alone, of many thousands in Oudh, responded to the call of Sir H. Lawrence, to come in to aid in the cause of those whose salt they had eaten. This motley little band of ancients was headed by a gallant Major of the Bengal Army, who apparently anxious to shew that he was a field officer, and perhaps in more prosperous days more given to ride than walk, had somehow procured a grasscutter's pony, from which his feet could with ease touch the ground, but being quite unable to procure a saddle or bridle, he contented himself with a blanket for the former, and with a rope for the latter, and thus he rode, apparently as well contented as if he were on a bounding Arab at the head of a smart Regiment. The Column had not long commenced its march, when those who were with the advance guard heard the sound of a continuous distant fire of Artillery, in the direction of Cawnpore. Later in the afternoon, on passing Bunnee Bridge, the Officer Commanding at that post reported that not only had he heard this cannonade during the day, but that it had been audible during the greater part of the previous day.

This naturally caused anxiety, for it was known how weak was the entrenchment at Cawnpore, and how limited in extent, while

various houses outside the walls had been necessarily used as receptacles of valuable stores, &c., and would probably, at all events, fall into the hands of an attacking enemy; General Windham's force, too, it was feared would be weak, and composed of detachments of Corps successively arriving.

Whatever might be the anxiety, however, the Commander-in-Chief was tied to his charge, and it was sunset before a camp was marked out about two miles in advance of Bunnee Bridge, and the night was far spent before the last cart and the rear guard came wearily into camp.

Next morning, the 28th, all were early astir, and the march commenced. Still no tidings from the place we were making for, and where alone we could obtain provisions and comforts for our charge. Soon again we heard the guns, and our anxieties revived for the bridge of boats, even though we hoped, as this was the third day of fighting, our troops might continue to hold out till night, when we trusted to be with them. Before noon, as we moved on, a Native suddenly jumped out of cover in a field, and ran up to the Staff at the head of the advance guard. He had a small rolled-up letter in the Greek character addressed "Most urgent, to General Sir Colin "Campbell or any officer commanding troops on the Lucknow road." The letter, still in my possession, was dated two days previously, and said that, unless affairs shortly took a favourable turn the troops would have to retire into the entrenchment; that the fighting had been most severe; and that the enemy were very powerful, especially in Artillery. It concluded by expressing a hope that the Commander-in-Chief would therefore see the necessity of pushing to their assistance with the utmost speed.

Soon after, Sir Colin left the Infantry and convoy to follow, and pushed on with the Cavalry and Horse Artillery, and leaving the latter at the plain of Mungulwar with orders to Sir Hope Grant to pitch the camp there, pushed on at a gallop with his staff. Soon Cawnpore was in sight and the bridge of boats, to the joy of all, happily untouched, but flames rising in every direction, mingling with the light of the setting sun, shewed that the enemy had taken the city, and a large part of the cantonments; and that many stores, including all the clothing and spare baggage of General Outram's Regiments, must have been destroyed; while cannon occasionally firing at the bridge, and musketry fire going on near the river bank, shewed

that matters were nearly at a crisis. An officer met the Commander-in-Chief and his party near the bridge, and expressed his joy at seeing us, adding, "we are at our last gasp." Over the bridge at a gallop, and we are amongst our own Infantry, actually defending some out-works of the entrenchment. As Sir Colin rode round the inside of the outwork to reach General Windham's head quarters, some of its defenders, part of the Rifle Brigade, turned round, and, recognizing the well-known face and figure they had often seen in the Crimea, raised a deafening cheer, a cheer that told they now felt confident. Hardly had the Chief reached General Windham, when a demand for aid came from the advanced post at the Baptist Chapel, but, before succour could be sent, the troops holding it had to retire, having suffered heavy loss, including several valuable officers killed.

The Commander-in-Chief remained some time, and all fighting having apparently ceased for the night, he arranged with General Windham to clear the enemy from some points near the bridge in the morning, ~~and to bring over part of his men at once~~, and then rode across the river to his camp, into which, all night, the guns, stores, women and sick, continued to stream.

At sunrise, Peel's guns, which had accomplished their 30 miles march only an hour before, were taken to the river side above the bridge of boats, to keep down the fire of the enemy from the opposite side, directed at the bridge. By 9 A. M. most of the Cavalry and Horse Artillery, and Brigadier Hope's Brigade crossed the bridge, and took up a position with their right near the entrenchment, and their left stretching away towards the Grand Trunk Road; the Commander-in-Chief also transferred his Head Quarters across the river, leaving Brigadier Inglis to protect the convoy until all had crossed. At 3 P. M. they commenced to pass the Bridge, and to take post behind the troops already over. During the night of the 30th there were some alarms, a little desultory firing, but no mischief done; and after 30 hours everything had been brought over, including the Rear Guard itself. The enemy still held the city and line of canal, and on the morning of the 2nd, cannonaded the Camp very smartly, but were eventually forced to withdraw their guns to a distance, owing to our occupying the houses of the General Gunge adjoining the canal, with our riflemen.

By the night of the 3rd, all necessary arrangements had been made to send off the women and children, and many of the wounded

to Allahabad, with which, communication, which had been temporarily suspended, was re-opened, and all the detachments on the road upwards, which had been stopped during the critical state of affairs at Cawnpore, were allowed to move on.

A strong detachment escorted the women and sick, but Sir Colin wished them to get to a safe distance before he attacked the Gwalior Contingent, lest the latter, broken by him, might double round on the convoy, and destroy it before it could arrive at Allahabad.

On the 5th, a very heavy and effective cannonade was opened on our outposts, but our Artillery after a time forced the enemy to withdraw their guns.

On the 6th, Sir Colin attacked and entirely defeated the Gwalior Contingent, having the inexpressible satisfaction of hearing, as the action was commencing, from the Superintendent of Telegraphs, who had just restored the line from Allahabad, that the women and sick were at that moment at the railway station, about 20 miles from Allahabad, and would in an hour or two be safe in the Fortress, whence they would be sent by steamer to Calcutta; and if they pleased, to England.

Thus ends the story of "The Relief of Lucknow." All three forces employed respectively in the Defence, and in the first relief, and in the final relief and bringing away of the garrison, did their duty and rendered very important service, and if anything I have said to-night has rendered the nature of that service more clear to the minds of my auditors, I am very thankful.

But I must not sit down without expressing my great obligation to my friend and old comrade Colonel Lumsden, for the plan* he was so good as to make for me, and without which my lecture would have been in some degree unintelligible.

* Reduced copy of this plan accompanies.